Perspectives on the Philosophy of Mind

Brian Wink, Lina Lukianskaite

Research output: Published contribution to conferencePaper

Abstract

The relationship between the non-physical mind and the physical brain has "over the centuries filled philosophers with frustration, desperation, almost panic" (Humphrey, 1992). Nevertheless, the majority of contemporary philosophers and scientists reject dualistic notions of the mind (e.g. Crick, 1979; Dennett, 1978), and neuroscientific findings continue to challenge the existence of a non-material mind that transcends the physiology of the brain (e.g. Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 2008; Fried et al., 2011). However, given the widely held religious, spiritual and paranormal beliefs that exist in society (Harris Poll, 2009), implicit dualistic beliefs appear common amongst the population more generally. Whilst the mind/body problem might be considered a "philosophical" one, our implicit beliefs about the issue can profoundly influence our behaviour. It is of course too simplistic to characterise the debate dichotomously as monism vs dualism, and this study uses Q methodology to explore a more complex set of beliefs about the materialistic/non-materialistic nature of the universe. College and university students were asked to indicate their level of agreement/disagreement with twenty seven statements, reflecting a continuum from Cartesian dualism at one end to mechanistic materialism at the other. Three distinct accounts emerged, which can be characterised as: irreducibly complex dualism, interactive dualism and explainable materialism.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2013
Event29th Annual Q Conference - Amsterdam, Netherlands
Duration: 5 Sep 20137 Sep 2013

Conference

Conference29th Annual Q Conference
CountryNetherlands
CityAmsterdam
Period5/09/137/09/13

Fingerprint

Dualism
Philosophy of Mind
Materialism
Philosopher
Frustration
Common Belief
Panic
College Students
Religion
Universe
Monism
Physiology
Mind-body Problem
Cartesian
Methodology
Polls
Paranormal
Physical

Cite this

Wink, B., & Lukianskaite, L. (2013). Perspectives on the Philosophy of Mind. Paper presented at 29th Annual Q Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Wink, Brian ; Lukianskaite, Lina. / Perspectives on the Philosophy of Mind. Paper presented at 29th Annual Q Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
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Wink, B & Lukianskaite, L 2013, 'Perspectives on the Philosophy of Mind' Paper presented at 29th Annual Q Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 5/09/13 - 7/09/13, .

Perspectives on the Philosophy of Mind. / Wink, Brian; Lukianskaite, Lina.

2013. Paper presented at 29th Annual Q Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Research output: Published contribution to conferencePaper

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Wink B, Lukianskaite L. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Mind. 2013. Paper presented at 29th Annual Q Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands.