In essence, the value of collective litigation in antitrust enforcement policy is the compensation of victims and the notion of corrective justice. By combining potential claims that otherwise might not have been filed, the collective redress device allows the antitrust injury to be compensated. Conversely, in the absence of such a mechanism, companies who violated competition rules could not be sued effectively due to the excessive transaction costs of prosecuting a suit. Hence, in addition to the lack of redress for victims, violators are retaining their ill-gotten gains. In principle, a collective redress regime overcomes these problems. However, the bundling of rights raises concerns in relation to potential abuse of collective redress mechanisms. While a collective action can lead to a better enforcement of legal norms, it may also enhance incentives for filing arbitrary claims or for threatening arbitrary litigation, with the sole aim of forcing payment without any real legal claim. Arguably, this expanded right of action provides more incentive for not only improved competition law enforcement but also for inflated, arbitrary and exploitative antitrust litigations.
|Journal||Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies|
|Publication status||Published - 2018|