The challenging of academic judgment has been a controversial topic over the years. There are two broad types of university decisions, namely, those based on academic judgment and those not involving academic judgment. The Education Act 2004 actually precludes the Office of the Independent Adjudicator from looking at matters that involve academic judgment, some examples of which are decisions concerning the marks awarded in examinations or other assessments, decisions on the class of degree awarded to a student, etc. This paper aims to add to the literature by, first, considering not only whether academic judgment can be challenged but also whether it ought to be challenged, and, secondly, analyzing the challenge of other university decisions on grounds relating to procedural impropriety, bias, negligence, etc.. In doing so, the authors focus on the subject area (or discipline) of law. After defining academic judgment and distinguishing it from other university decisions, the authors consider various issues relating to the two types of challenges, and suggest some measures to help improve the present position.
|Number of pages||26|
|Journal||Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies|
|Publication status||Published - Dec 2018|